Коротаев Андрей Витальевич

Традиционные кланово-племенные структуры и современная политическая система Сомали

2024 · ARTICLE · ru

В ходе данного исследования мы пытаемся выявить, какое влияние традиционная кланово-племенная система оказывает на организацию политической власти в современномСомали. Для этого производится анализ кланово-племенной принадлежности первых лиц сомалийского государства. Дается описание традиционной кланово-племенной организации сомалийцев, а также современная клановая ситуация в стране. Предпринимается попытка выяснить как кланово-племенная организация влияет на распределение высших государственных должностей. Предлагается объяснение того факта, что представители кланово-племенного объединения раханвейн обычно не занимают посты президента и премьер-министра Сомали и даже не выдвигают своих кандидатов. Приоритетное право на занятие постов президента и премьера на федеральном уровне сохраняется за представителями «благородных» верблюдоводческих суперкланов хавийе и дарод. С другой стороны, за представителями раханвейн зарезервирована позиция спикера парламента, который к тому же должен исполнять функции главы государства – президента в критически важные моменты, когда прежний президент по тем или иным причинам оказывается неспособным выполнять свои обязанности, вплоть до следующих президентских выборов. Сложилось и более или менее приемлемое для всех основных игроков пространственное распределение власти между основными сомалийскими суперкланами, когда Пунтленд и Джубаленд контролируют представители дарод, Галмудуг и Хиршабелле возглавляют представители хавийе, а представители преимущественно земледельческого суперклана раханвейн контролируют один штат – Юго-Западный, но наиболее ресурсный и плодородный. В целом проведенное нами исследование показывает, что достигнутые в 2000 г. неформальные артинские договоренности, обеспечившие более или менее приемлемое для всех основных кланово-племенных игроков распределение власти между основными сомалийскими суперкланами, соблюдались в последующие годы с удивительной точностью, и это, несмотря на все те колоссальные потрясения, которые данная страна испытала в XXI веке. Имеются основания полагать, что данное обстоятельство внесло свой вклад в определенную стабилизацию федеральной политической структурыСомали, сумевшей выдержать ожесточенный натиск со стороны радикальных исламистов.

Количественный анализ факторов террористической активности: систематический обзор

2024 · ARTICLE · ru

С начала XXI века значительно выросло количество эмпирических исследований, посвященных анализу факторов, влияющих на риски террористической активности. При этом оценки влияния отдельных факторов могут отличаться в разных исследованиях, из-за чего возникает потребность в обобщающей работе, в которой будут рассмотрены ключевые результаты. В данной статье представлен анализ результатов количественных исследований факторов, влияющих на террористическую активность (было проанализировано 75 работ за 2011–2022 годы). Наиболее широко исследованные детерминанты терроризма можно разделить на три группы: политические, социальные и экономические. Всего было выделено 53 фактора, статистическая значимость которых была выявлена как минимум в двух работах. Исследования факторов террористической дестабилизации последних десяти лет показали, что наибольшие риски террористической дестабилизации имеют страны с гибридным политическим режимом (анократией), в состоянии внутреннего или внешнего конфликта, со слабой центральной властью (например, «хрупкие» или «несостоявшиеся» государства), со средним уровнем социальноэкономического развития (т. е. со средними уровнями подушевого ВВП, урбанизации и охвата населения формальным образованием), хотя в последние годы зона наибольшего риска террористической активности несколько сдвинулась в сторону социальноэкономически наименее развитых стран. Кроме того, для этих государств характерны низкие темпы экономического роста и высокая инфляция, большие объемы иностранной финансовой поддержки, высокий уровень неравенства, достаточно многочисленное население, выраженная дискриминация меньшинств, а также высокие уровни репрессий и террористической активности в предшествующие годы.

Will Global Aging Change the Rate of Technological Progress and Form a New Consumption Model?

2024 · ARTICLE · en

The article discusses how the pace of technological progress and economic model of society will change under the influence of global aging process. It tries to answer the following questions: What could be the driver of an acceleration of technological growth in the forthcoming decades? Is slowdown of technological growth likely to be observed afterwards? What could cause such a slow-down? How could this slowdown affect socioeconomic and sociopolitical relations? What is the relationship between global aging and technological progress? Why is global aging likely to be one of the most important factors affecting technological growth in the near future?

Revolutionary and Quasi-Revolutionary Events in Somalia (1960–2023)

2024 · CHAPTER · en

Is the Fifth Generation of Revolution Studies Still Coming?

2024 · ARTICLE · en

Recently, several significant studies have been published on revolutions, various aspects of the theory of revolution, and revolutions of recent times—the 21st century. Some of these studies will be discussed in this review essay. These studies deserve the most careful reading and analysis, consideration of their strengths and weaknesses in relation to the aspect of research chosen by the authors, theoretical approaches, analysis of their methodology, or the depth of showing certain revolutionary events, which must be done. However, in this review essay, we will analyze these works from the point of view of considering the prospects of the so-called fifth generation of revolution studies. Of course, this generational approach is subject to criticism. For example, RaduAlexandru Cucută (2013) talks about generational deadlock and writes that ‘the generational perspective remains impermissibly flexible and elusive, ignoring the main paradigmatic debates within the field of study’ (p. 1107). Colin Beck and Daniel Ritter (2021) are also generally critical of this bias, which creates a false premise. They encourage us to look at ideas, rather than attributing them to one generation or another. There is a rational grain in this criticism. In no case should we limit ourselves to such an analysis or make the division into generations of researchers absolute. But, however, one cannot absolutize any approach as the only correct and true one. Each approach has its own advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, the main thing is to clearly understand the advantages and disadvantages of the approach and the limits of its application. In defense of the generational approach, which is based on an obviously very conventional division into generations, let us say that despite all criticisms, it has an important basis. This basis is a change in the forms and types of revolutions and world-system conditions over a period of one to two to three decades (that is, precisely the period of strengthening and flourishing of a certain generation of researchers and their approaches). Moreover, new revolutionary forms and types obviously require the need to theoretically respond to these changes. This turn in approaches to analysis and aspects of the study of revolutions largely determines the beginning of the rise of a new generation of researchers. But let us immediately note that the boundaries between generations of researchers are usually unclear, blurred; therefore, both the assignment of one or another researcher to one or another generation, and the very identification of a new generation are always debatable points (especially since the dating of the activities of generations differs significantly, see below). Thus, as we will see below, there are many different perspectives on the so-called fifth generation, ranging from the claim that there is no fifth generation at all (Goldstone, 2024) to the idea that the fifth generation was precocious and unfruitful, that it failed and faded (Allinson, 2019). Our point of view will be expressed below. Here we would like to emphasize once again that the generational approach, especially the discussion of the fifth generation, allows us to focus more clearly on the changes that have occurred in the World System in recent decades and on the characteristics of revolutionary events, as well as on what methods and directions will be most fruitful for the most thorough analysis of these changes.

USAID Democracy Promotion as a Possible Predictor of Revolutionary Destabilization

2024 · ARTICLE · en

USAID democracy promotion programs might not only influence the democracy levels, but also increase the likelihood of revolutionary uprisings in the recipient states. Democracy promotion can strengthen political opponents of the incumbent regime via support for alternative media, civil society groups and political parties, on one hand, and, on the other, support democratic institutions that in contrast to autocracies are more tolerable towards political opponents and thus allow more room for expressing political will on the streets. Since democracy aid targets “democrats” who are less prone to exert armed violence, the authors expect it to be associated with unarmed uprisings. Using logit regression models, they find that the volume of the USAID financial democracy assistance appears to be a significant predictor of unarmed revolutionary destabilization, but its effect is relatively weak. Some particular sub-sectors of democracy assistance have an impact on revolutionary destabilization, namely: civil society, elections, human rights and media assistance. These correlations might be partly explained by the fact that USAID assistance goes disproportionately to anocracies. This aid tends to increase the probability of revolutionary destabilization in two ways – directly (through strengthening political opponents of the regime) and indirectly (through increasing the number of anocracies in the world).

Discussion Among the Fifth-Generation Circle. A rejoinder to Mark Beissinger, Daniel Ritter, Valentine Moghadam, Egor Fain, and Alisa Shishkina

2024 · ARTICLE · en

First of all, we would like to sincerely thank our critics for their work, for being able to find the opportunity to read our voluminous books, especially the Handbook of Revolutions (Goldstone et al., 2022b), which indeed came out much larger than we had planned, although unfortunately many topics and problems were left ‘off the table’ or were insufficiently exposed, as evidenced by the critical comments. We are grateful to our critics for being able to see the merits in our collective monographs, but even more so for their criticism, not only for that we consider fair and deserved, but also for that, we disagree with. For the latter, because this kind of criticism provides food for thought and stimulates argumentation, but perhaps most importantly, because it allows us to dwell on aspects that we would otherwise not have had the chance to cover. Discussions between authors (editors) and critics often turn into infighting, which quickly becomes uninteresting to the reader. This would be very undesirable, so that, we tried to make this rejoinder in a different key, to use it as a good, somewhat unique opportunity to generalize and at the same time specify many ideas and formulations regarding the directions of the fifth generation of revolution studies that were mentioned in our own review essay (Grinin and Korotayev, 2024, this issue). We also want to touch on those points that have not been mentioned or not mentioned enough. Our critics are exactly those authors whose books we presented in our own review essay (Grinin and Korotayev, 2024, this issue), and about whom we said that all of them are already representatives of the fifth generation. And since we hope that we can also be counted among this generation, we would like to present this answer precisely as a discussion within a certain circle of authors of the fifth generation. Our esteemed critics have pointed out many of the merits and demerits (at least in their opinion) of our books. However, some important or even very important aspects in terms of expanding the understanding of the directions of research of the fifth generation were not mentioned. This allows us to focus on clarifying the directions of work and program for the fifth generation in a more systematic manner. The further structure of the article is related to our desire to focus on the characteristics and tasks associated with the fifth generation. First, we will consider (1) those positive aspects of our work that have been noted by critics; then (2) we will respond to those points that critics consider important shortcomings, but this will be a discussion associated with certain theoretical or methodological approaches; furthermore, (3) we will discuss a number of important theoretical issues that are raised in reviews; (4) we will discuss an important question that was actually raised by Beissinger (2024, this issue)—how should a researcher of revolution relate to revolutions; and (5) we will conclude the article with a discussion of issues that were not addressed in the reviews and some ideas about what the fifth generation needs.

Global Evolutionary Perspectives on Gender Differences in Religiosity, Family, Politics and Pro-Social Values Based on the Data from the World Values Survey

2024 · ARTICLE · en

Recent studies show that the global increase in gender equality does not reduce gender differences in values. These findings somewhat undermine the social role theory and increase the need for additional explanations. These findings also imply that gender differences in values may stem from some underlying universalities that persist even through changes associated with socio-economic development. This gives us reason to explore an evolutionary perspective on gender differences in values. We discuss evolutionary mechanisms that could underlie certain universal gender differences in values, and then test whether these differences are truly universal across the world (we use data from World Values Survey to search for empirical support for our evolutionary hypotheses). We provide evidence for the global scale of gender differences in religiosity, family values, political values, and pro-social values through our calculations.

Глобальные трансформации Мир-Системы и контуры нового мирового порядка

2024 · ARTICLE · ru

В статье рассматриваются процессы трансформации МирСистемы, находящие выражение в крупных, фактически стадиальных изменениях. Мир-Система находится в фазе, предшествующей переходу в новое качественное состояние, с изменением баланса сил в самых разных аспектах и параметрах. В рамках анализа, проведенного в статье, отмечается, что такие изменения происходят редко, раз в несколько десятков лет, и периоды глубоких изменений могут длиться долго. Авторы предполагают, что период реконфигурации МирСистемы и формирование нового мирового порядка займёт не менее полуторадвух десятилетий, а, возможно, и больше. При этом авторы приходят к выводу, что это будет турбулентный период с дальнейшим обострением противоречий и возможным переходом к вооруженным столкновениям. Важная идея статьи – эти коренные трансформации происходят в результате не только изменения международных отношений и баланса сил в военно-технологическом потенциале стран и геополитического расклада в целом (что обязательно), но и накопления крупных качественных изменений практически во всех сферах: от демографической до культурной, от технологической до идеологической. В статье анализируется динамика таких изменений за последние десятилетия.

Cybernetic Revolution and Global Aging. Humankind on the Way to Cybernetic Society, or the Next Hundred Years

2024 · BOOK · en

This series seeks to promote understanding of large-scale and long-term processes of social change, in particular the many facets and implications of globalization. It critically explores the factors that affect the historical formation and current evolution of social systems, on both the regional and global level. Processes and factors that are examined include economies, technologies, geopolitics, institutions, conflicts, demographic trends, climate change, global culture, social movements, global inequalities, etc. Building on world-systems analysis, the series addresses topics such as globalization from historical and comparative perspectives, trends in global inequalities, core-periphery relations and the rise and fall of hegemonic core states, transnational institutions, and the long-term energy transition. This ambitious interdisciplinary and international series presents cutting-edge research by social scientists who study whole human systems and is relevant for all readers interested in systems approaches to the emerging world society, especially historians, political scientists, economists, sociologists, geographers and anthropologists.