Никитин Максим Игоревич

Глобализация, режимы валютных курсов и финансовая цепная реакция

2022 · ARTICLE · ru

The crisis of the euro zone in 2010–2012 brought several important questions to the fore, including the question of the proper level of financial integration and the optimal exchange rate arrangements between countries that are part of tightly knit financial networks. Using a simple Diamond–Dybvig style theoretical model, we show that the effects of increased financial interconnectedness and different exchange rate regimes on financial stability should not be studied in isolation from one another. We demonstrate that a switch from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate regime in one country increases the financial fragility of multicurrency systems in a complete network of financial links but decreases fragility if the network of links is incomplete. On the other hand, an increase in financial interconnectedness reduces fragility under a fixed exchange rate regime but does not necessarily do so under a flexible exchange rate regime.

Financially-Constrained Lawyers: An Economic Theory of Legal Disputes

2018 · ARTICLE · en

Financial constraints reduce the lawyer's ability to file lawsuits and bring cases to trial. As a result, access to justice for victims, pretrial bargaining, and potential injurers' precaution might be affected. We study civil litigation using a model that allows for asymmetric information, financially-constrained lawyers, third-party lawyer lending, and a continuum of plaintiff's types. We contribute to the economic analysis of law by generalizing seminal models of litigation (Bebchuk, 1984, Bebchuk, 1988; Katz, 1990), offering the first formal definition of access to justice, and presenting comprehensive social welfare analysis of relevant public policy. We provide complete equilibrium characterization and identify necessary conditions for the existence of the mixed- and pure-strategy PBE. Access to justice is denied to some victims under the mixed-strategy equilibrium. We then study the social welfare effects of policies aimed at relaxing lawyers' financial constraints, and identify a necessary and sufficient condition for a welfare-enhancing effect.

Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Tort Reform Under Self-Serving Bias

2014 · CHAPTER · en

In civil litigation, although most cases settle before trial, many do not settle early, and some do not settle at all. Delayed settlement or impasse causes high costs for the parties and for society. Babcock et al. (1995a, 1997), Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) and Loewenstein et al. (1993) propose an explanation for disputes that rests on a judgment error called ìself-serving bias.î Self-serving bias refers to the litigantís biased beliefs that the court decision will favor his case due to the interpretation of the facts of the dispute in his own favor. In information environments characterized by ambiguity, even when the parties are exposed to the exact same information, they might arrive at expectations of an adjudicated settlement that are biased in a self-serving manner. As a result, higher likelihood of disputes might be observed. Note that the litigation outcomes might influence potential injurersí level of care, i.e., their expenditures on accident prevention (Png, 1987; Landeo et al., 2006, 2007a, 2007b). Hence, the defendantís level of care, social welfare and the effects of tort reform might also be affected by self-serving bias. Despite the active experimental literature on self-serving bias and pretrial bargaining, and the robustness of these findings, there has been very little theoretical work on this topic. This chapter presents a strategic model of incentives for care and litigation under asymmetric information and self-serving bias, and studies the effects of caps on non-economic damages.

Учителя

2013 · CHAPTER · ru

Двойное заражение: влияние глобализации и валютного режима на уязвимость финансовой системы

2012 · CHAPTER · ru

За последние 30 лет в мире произошло резкое увеличение числа финансовых кризисов. Очень часто кризис в одной стране превращается в «вирус», который распространяется на другие страны, приводя к банковским или валютным кризисам. В данном исследовании мы пытаемся ответить на два взаимосвязанных вопроса: 1) является ли возросшая уязвимость мировой финансовой системы неизбежным следствием глобализации; 2) Можно ли увеличить устойчивость мировой финансовой системы за счет перехода стран от режимов управляемых валютных курсов к плавающим?

Гражданско-правовой спор в условиях завышенных ожиданий

2010 · PREPRINT · en

Information Acquisition, Coordination and Fundamentals in a Financial Crisis

2008 · ARTICLE · en

This paper reconciles the two explanations of a financial crisis, the self-fulfilling prophecy and the fundamental causes, in an empirically-relevant framework, by explicitly modeling the costly voluntary acquisition of information about fundamentals in a variant of Diamond and Dybvig [Diamond, D., Dybvig, P., 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91, 401–419]. The model exhibits strategic complementarity in information acquisition. In the “partial run” equilibrium investors engage in costly evaluation of projects, so that banks with lower-return projects fail. There also exist the classic “full-run” and “no-run” equilibria in which there is no project evaluation. Investors’ coordination on a specific equilibrium is triggered by a self-fulfilling prophecy. So, financial crises are seen as both fundamentals-based and self-fulfilling prophecies-based phenomena.

Dollarization and the Inflation threshold

2007 · ARTICLE · en

Empirical evidence suggests non-linearity in the impact of inflation on financial intermediation and real activity. Evidence also suggests that high inflation affects financial intermediation through the substitution of dollars 'under the mattress' for savings in domestic banks. We model an economy where inflation and real activity are positively related at low levels of inflation. However, when the inflation rate exceeds a threshold, agents substitute dollars for deposits issued by domestic banks, reducing the scale of financial intermediation and investment. As a consequence, at high levels of inflation, capital stock and output become negatively related to the inflation rate.

Split-Awards and Disputes: An Experimental Study of a Strategic Model of Litigation

2007 · ARTICLE · en

This paper studies experimentally the impact of the split-award statute, where the state takes a share of the plaintiff's punitive damage award, on litigation outcomes. Our findings indicate that dispute rates are significantly lower when bargaining is performed under the split-award institution. Defendants’ litigation losses and plaintiffs’ net compensation are significantly reduced by the split-award statute.

Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes under Court Errors, with Claudia M. Landeo and Scott Baker

2007 · ARTICLE · en